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We develop a structural model of credit risk in a network economy. In particular,
we are able to account for complex counterparty relationships, where one company may
be indirectly aﬀected by the credit risk of another company in the network. In this re-
spect, we generalize Jarrow and Yu (2001) and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Hugonnier
(2003), but do so in the rich context of a structural form model. We provide closed form
formulae for the price of risky debt and equity, which depend upon the lending/borrowing
relationships in the economy. Our model applies to completely general lender/borrower
relationships, including looping relationships. Our formulae can apply to cases where
not only ﬁnancial ﬂows but also operations are dependent across ﬁrms. In order to
achieve these results, we use queueing theory. This paper thus represents one of the ﬁrst
applications of queueing theory to ﬁnance.
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1. Introduction
Classical credit risk models, whether of the structural-form or the reduced-form
type, tend to consider ﬁrms in isolation from the network of economic relationships
that would truly reﬂect the reality of credit risk. For example the Merton (1974)
model (and its successors that have generated the structural form literature) takes
a company-speciﬁc exogenous process that drives the value of the assets of the
ﬁrm (some alternative models use the value of a ﬂow such as EBIT), and relates
this process to some form of company-speciﬁc barrier, the face value of debt, to
infer the credit risk of that ﬁrm. In reality, the economic condition of any one ﬁrm
is generally not independent of the many other ﬁrms in the economy that it has
relationships with. Suppliers’, clients’, borrowers’, competitor’s defaults will aﬀect
the credit risk of any one company. Indeed, any company is part of a network of
relationships that aﬀects its credit standing. While classical credit risk models have
addressed this issue indirectly (as the interest rate may capture part of the business
cycle, or a general economic downturn may be captured by the underlying value
process), they do not capture the reality of the phenomenon and do not account
for well-known facts in credit risk, such as clustering and contagion. Contagion has
been studied in a diﬀerent area of the economic literature from asset pricing: see
for instance Allen and Gale (1998) and (2000), Kyle and Xiong (2001), Giesecke
and Weber (2002), Kodres and Pritsker (2002). Classical reduced form models
(e.g., Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) or Jarrow and Turnbull (1995)) do not address
these issues either: they take an exogenous default process as given. More recent
reduced-form models have attempted to address the issue of counterparty risk inC      R         N       E       3
a simple setting: what happens to a company’s credit risk if the default process
is conditional on another company’s credit risk situation. Jarrow and Yu (2001)
attempt to solve this problem when the relationship is unidirectional: company
A’s credit risk is impacted by company B’s credit risk, but B’s credit risk is not
aﬀected by A’s. This analysis has been generalized to looping eﬀects between two
counterparties A and B by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Hugonnier (2003): A’s
credit risk is impacted by B’s credit risk and B’s credit risk is aﬀected by A’s
credit risk. Overall though, network eﬀects are not accounted for in their general
complexity in this type of model. Indeed reduced form models tend to abstract the
default process from the economic drivers of the credit risk reality. They provide
us with a powerful framework to understand some of the complexities of credit
risk and useful tools for the pricing of derivative instruments, but cannot account
at this stage for the complex reality of the network of relationships a company is
embedded in.
We propose a structural form model that analyzes an economy composed of I
ﬁrms engaged in a network of possibly looping lending relationships. Our model
focuses on lending relationships for simpliﬁcation but can easily be interpreted in
terms of trade credit relationships or general business relationships (competitive
analysis). Because we analyze the network in its entirety, we can price the debt of
3 ﬁrms A, B, and C, where A lends to B, B lends to C, and C lends to A, so that
loop eﬀects are complex and indirect. These relationships induce a speciﬁc risk,
i.e., counterparty risk, whereby the default of one ﬁrm can precipitate the default
not only of its creditors but also of the ﬁrms in relationships with its creditors.
Credit risk of any one ﬁrm is thus aﬀected throughout the network.
In order to solve this complex problem, we use queueing theory, an analyticalC      R         N       E       4
tool rarely used in ﬁnance up until now. The reader is referred to Gross and Harris
(1985) for a classical introduction to that topic.
Our structural model is ﬂow-based as in Mello and Parsons (1992), Mella-
Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Goldstein, Ju and Leland (1998)(2001). The
driver to the value of the claims on a ﬁrm is a revenue process rather than an
asset value process. Also, ﬁrms make capital structure choices along time. In one
version of our model, when ﬁrms grow they reﬁnance, and when they shrink they
reimburse debt. This is consistent, for instance with quadratic or zero reﬁnancing
costs. As stressed in Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001), reﬁnancing is an important
feature missed by many structural form models. Indeed, when choosing their debt
levels, ﬁrms and their lenders are aware of the possibility for these ﬁrms to reduce
or increase their chosen debt level. This option to reﬁnance will aﬀect ﬁnancing
choices. Shareholders can also exercise strategically their option to default. Upon
default, shareholders lose their stake in the company, i.e., they stop receiving
dividends, and ownership changes hands. Bankruptcy costs are then incurred by
the debtholders. When ownership changes hands ﬁrms become less eﬃcient, and
stakeholders (debtholders and new shareholders) must inject an extra quantity
of capital to return to the previous level of eﬃciency. As a result, bankruptcy
represents a net cost for the debtholders. When reﬁnancing costs are zero it is not
optimal for shareholders to default. We therefore develop another model, where
debt is quasi-constant, and bankruptcy can be an optimal strategy.
Our structural approach is closest to that of Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001),
with the speciﬁc transformations necessary to use queueing theory. Their model is
one of the few models where reﬁnancing can occur at any time (with debt of inﬁnite
maturity), an important feature to consider in a network context of ﬁnancingC      R         N       E       5
relationships like ours (we consider a slight generalization of their model to debt-
decreasing reﬁnancings). Their model also provides a nice closed-form solution for
equity value and debt value under strategic bankruptcy. Our approach generalizes
their result to network situations. We also relate to Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner
(1989), but consider only variable reﬁnancing costs.
An important assumption of our model is that ﬁrms want to keep their cash ac-
count stable: when the cash account is too high, the ﬁrm pays out more dividends,
and spends more. When it is too low, it pays out less dividends and reduces
expenses. The empirical ﬁnance literature shows indeed that cash accounts are
mean-reverting and thus this assumption seems justiﬁed. The reader is referred
to Opler et al (1999), Cossin and Hricko (2002), and Mello and Parsons (2000) for
theoretical arguments on the topic.
Finally, we model the ﬁnancial arm (we also use the term treasury or cash
management unit) of each ﬁrm as a queue, and these queues form a network.
In this network, debt payments are exchanged continuously between lenders and
borrowers. The input ﬂow in each queue consists therefore of revenue (ﬁnancial
and non-ﬁnancial), and the output ﬂow of expenses (ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial).
Cash managers optimize their queue in a way to maintain their optimal cash
target. The treasury allocates expenses between 3 types of claimants: lenders,
shareholders, and the production unit of the ﬁrm. The randomness of the service
oﬀered by the queue reﬂects the randomness of the environment facing the cash
management unit: diﬃculties in extending lines of credit, reducing costs, modifying
dividends, or monitoring agents.
The main results of this paper are theorems 2, 3, and 4 which price ﬁrm equity
and total debt as a function of the following observables: each ﬁrm current revenue,C      R         N       E       6
expenses, and dividend, and the coupon payments between every ﬁrm.
This paper consists of three diﬀerent sections. Section 2 presents the ﬁrst
version of our model, with zero reﬁnancing cost and debt varying continuously.
Section 3 presents the second version, with linear reﬁnancing costs and quasi-
constant debt. Finally, in section 4 we show applications of our results, namely
how the conﬁguration of the counterparty network aﬀects counterparty risk in
various examples. Giesecke and Weber (2002) among others have showed in a
diﬀerent context that diversiﬁcation reduces counterparty risk; while we observed
this to be true in general, we found a particular network structure where there is a
clear optimum number of counterparties, in terms of minimization of instantaneous
risk.
Notation
We have i =1 ..I ﬁrms. When the meaning is clear from the context, we some-
times drop the subscript i of a variable Xi. The mean of a mean stationary process
X is denoted ¯ X. The symbol ∆X(s) stands for X(s)−X(s−). Expectation, vari-
ance, and covariance (conditional on the information at time zero unless otherwise
speciﬁed) under the risk-neutral measure (deﬁned in section 2.2) are denoted EQ
, Va r Q,CovQ . The value of indicator function 1[A] is equal to one if the event A
is true and zero otherwise. We use the superscript t for vector transposition.C      R         N       E       7
2. Varying Debt
2.1 The Queueing Model
For each ﬁrm i we deﬁne the following variables: revenue Ai (including non-
ﬁnancial revenue Ri) and expenses Hi (including variable production costs Ci).
The former variables are net of ﬁxed operating costs, i.e., non-ﬁnancial revenue
minus variable costs corresponds to EBIT. For simplicity, we assume no taxes. We
also deﬁne dividends Di,d e b tp a y m e n t sf r o mﬁ r mi to ﬁrm jP ij,a n dZi the value
of the cash account. The value of the cash account follows then:
Z(t) − Z(0) = A(t) − H(t) (1)
To model counterparty risk in our network, we consider separately ﬁnancial
revenue
￿
j￿=iPji, which consists of the debt payments from a ﬁrm’s borrower(s),





Non-ﬁnancial revenue Ri is modelled as a homogenous doubly-stochastic Pois-
son (Cox) process with stochastic intensity:
νi(t,ω)=¯ νi(ω) (3)
in the risk-neutral measure. Compared to standard Poisson processes, doubly-
stochastic Poisson processes present the following modelling advantages:
• non-ﬁnancial revenue across ﬁrms can be correlated, reﬂecting the fact that
the same common factors (business cycle, interest rates, etc.) aﬀects themC      R         N       E       8
• the two parameters available to describe a standard Poisson process, namely
intensity and unit of measurement of revenue ($, cent...) are not suﬃcient
to calibrate our model to the dynamics of revenue and cash account.
The treasury manages the cash account optimally in order to balance revenue
(ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial) and expenses (ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial). Also,
we assume that ﬁrms opt for a constant target leverage, that is, they take more
debt when leverage is under the target, and reimburse debt otherwise. Goldstein
et al (2001) prove that this is optimal in the case of reﬁnancings occurring at
discrete times. Debt payments are then the sum of coupon payments plus principal
reimbursement (when over target) minus the proceeds from additional debt (when
under target). Each unit of revenue incoming at time s remains a sojourn time
τs
i exponentially distributed with parameter pi, before going to net expenses (a
more proper but more cumbersome notation would be τ
Ai(s)
i ). Sojourn times are
IID. We will see in theorem 1 that pi is somehow proportional to the speed of
mean-reversion of the cash account Zi to its target value. For a discussion on








i ≤ t −s] (4)
We also assume that lending relationships are stationary, i.e., at any reﬁnancing
time ﬁrm i borrows from j the same proportion of the proceeds. At any time s a
unit of expense is therefore allocated among either net variable costs Ci, dividends
Di,o rp a y m e n t sPij to lender j according to the draw of a random variable which






Introducing the exit process Q,w eh a v et h e n
Qi ≡ Ci +Di (6)




Our model of the economy is therefore equivalent to a Jackson network of
M/M/∞ queues. Each queue represents a ﬁrm, and the ﬂow variable is money.
We show in ﬁgure 1 a Jackson network of 3 ﬁrms, where ﬁrm 1 lent money to
ﬁrm 3, which lent money to ﬁrm 2, which lent money to ﬁrm 1 (debt payments
are therefore in the reverse order).
In theorem 1 below we report some well-known results of queueing theory,
namely a diﬀusion approximation of the dynamics of the cash account. By deﬁni-
tion, stochastic equilibrium, or steady state, is the state of the world where the cash
account value follows a stationary distribution. We deﬁne R(n) (respectively Z(n))
to be the revenue (respectively the cash account value) when revenue intensity is
increased by a factor n,a n dt h es i z eo ft h er e v e n u ej u m pi s$ 1
n.I n t h e o r e m 1
below, we put together well-known results from queueing theory, which show that
the cash account in our model is stationary and analytically tractable, and help










Figure 1: A Jackson Network with 3 Firms.
THEOREM 1. Suppose ν constant. Let α solve




If the cash accounts Z(n) are never empty, then:
PQ(Z(n)(t) ≤ z)=P Q(Zc(t) ≤ z)+o(n− 1
2) (9)
where Zc follows:









i (∞)] = ¯ Zi =
αi
pi
(11)C      R         N       E       11
f o rs o m em a t r i c e sP and Σ which are functions of only p,ν,and λ, and WQ
Brownian motion in the risk-neutral measure. In stochastic equilibrium each Z
(n)
i
(∞) follows an (independent) Poisson distribution.
In other terms, cash account values follow approximately a vector Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process when cash accounts are never empty. If this is not the case, the
diﬀusion approximation becomes much less tractable. For expositional simplicity,
the revenue rate ν ( i nt h i ss e c t i o n )d o e sn o tg r o w ,l i k ei td o e si no t h e rm o d e l s
(e.g. Goldstein et al 2001). However our model and our results can be extended
in two diﬀerent ways. First, we can easily introduce a deterministic growth rate of
the economy m, which results in inﬂating all stock variables by a factor exp(mt).
Second, we can introduce a ﬁrm-speciﬁc growth rate µi. We will describe the latter
in the next section.
2.2 Pricing
The uncertainty is described by the ﬁltered probability space (Ω,F,{Ft},PQ)
where P Q is an equivalent measure under which discounted asset prices are mar-




Ct Dt P t Rt
￿
(12)
The smallest σ-ﬁeld on Ω for which X is measurable is denoted by F￿.M a r k e t s
are incomplete, i.e., F￿ ⊂F.F o raF￿
T-measurable claim C￿ :Ω→ R occurring at










t] (13)C      R         N       E       12
This treatment of incompleteness is standard (see e.g., remark 2 p.7 in Collin-



























Since the estimator ˆ νi of non-ﬁnancial revenue for ﬁrm i c a nb ei na l lg e n e r a l i t y
correlated with ˆ νj, the same estimator for ﬁrm j, equations (14) and (15) show
that credit contagion occurs across ﬁrms whose revenues are linked neither through
exposure to common macroeconomic factors nor through direct payment links. It
suﬃces that ﬁrms be indirectly linked in the counterparty network. The same fact
was observed in Kodres and Pritsker (2002) p. 785.C      R         N       E       13
To determine credit spreads, the benchmark of the structural models, the Mer-
ton (1974) model, requires (roughly) the knowledge of three ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables,
today’s ﬁrm value, its volatility, and the principal outstanding. In our model, apart
from network-speciﬁc parameters (the ratio λi/
￿
j λij) we also need to know three
ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, the percentage of expenses
￿
j λij allocated to debt pay-
ments, the estimator ¯ ν(t) of the long run value of non-ﬁnancial revenue intensity,
and the principal outstanding.
3. Quasi-Constant Debt
In the previous section, the policies for reﬁnancing, dividend distribution and
investment in production were identical: a decrease/increase in revenue aﬀects
them equally. In this section, debt payments are quasi-constant, that is, they vary
very slowly compared to revenue dynamics. They are proportional to the estima-
tor ˆ α(t) of the long run value of revenue intensity, which in our model varies more
slowly than revenue intensity α(t). The interpretation is the following. Whereas
ˆ α captures the systematic (and priced) component of revenue risk, α captures
in addition revenue noise, corresponding to idiosyncratic risk. The function of
the treasury is now threefold. First, the treasury delivers quasi-constant debt
payments by maintaining a large cash account, which by covenants cannot be ap-
propriated by shareholders upon default. Second, the ﬁrm has the ﬂexibility to
allocate revenue optimally between dividends and production costs. We assume
in this section that ﬁrms are ”production-driven”, in the sense that the propor-
tion of the payout that is reinvested is exogenously determined by the production
unit, therefore the shareholders claim have a lower priority. Third, the treasury
smoothes earnings and hides revenue noise from the market. We will see how thisC      R         N       E       14
feature helps mitigate ﬁnancial contagion, and allows to ﬁnd formulae for equity
and debt by decoupling the bankruptcy decision.
Unlike the previous model, it is now optimal for the ﬁrm to declare bankruptcy
at time T. We then consider two diﬀerent bankruptcy regimes. In the ﬁrst one,
debtholders inject extra capital to make the ﬁrm return to its previous level of
eﬃciency. In the second case, debtholders do not inject any extra capital.
The dynamics of net revenue, in this section, were chosen speciﬁcally to obtain
analytic expressions for the bounds used in lemma 1. Nevertheless, we believe that
much more general processes yield the same results.
3.1 The Queueing Model
To implement constant debt payment ﬂows in our network, the obvious solu-
tion would be to make our routing parameters c,d,λ state dependent: if the cash
account is low, assign more cash to the debt payments. Unfortunately, this would
make the dynamics intractable. This can be seen in the diﬀusion approximation of
Mandelbaum and Pats (1998): the drift of the cash account becomes non-linear.
Therefore we keep constant parameters c,d,λ, but, instead of allocating expenses
at the output of the queue, we allocate it before entering the queue. A portion
c + d of the revenue A is routed to AA, which is devoted to production costs and
dividends, and the rest to AB,w i t h :
A = AA + AB
To regularize debt payments, we introduce a second queue G/M/∞,w h i c hw e
call queue B, which is meant to have a large cash account ZB:C      R         N       E       15
Z
B
i (t) − Z
B






The treasury smoothes earnings by maintaining another cash account ZA,
which is a Markovian queue and called queue A. Unlike queue B, queue A is
not meant to completely regularize earnings, so that its cash account can be much
smaller. We have then:
ZA(t) − ZA(0) = AA(t) − Q(t)
The allocation of Q between dividends D and production costs C is dictated
by the exogenous proportion-to-payout process δ.W ec a l lTk













i )(1 − ci −δi(Tk
i−))]dt +σiδi(t)dWδ
i (t) (21)
δi(0) = 1 −ci (22)
where Wδ
i is PQ Brownian motion on F￿. We assume that the ﬂuctuations
of δ represent mostly idiosyncratic risk, so that each Wδ
i is independent from all
other random variables. We model two diﬀerent bankruptcy regimes, resulting in
diﬀerent forms for the function e :
ASSUMPTION 1: At bankruptcy, debtholders restore the ﬁrm to its normalC      R         N       E       16
level of eﬃciency, that is e in (21) is the Dirac function. The k−th bankruptcy
cost BCk
i is independent on the default time Tk
i and is proportional to ﬁrm size,





t] = wiˆ αi(t) (23)
It is then easy to see that at all bankruptcy times t = Tk
i and at t =0we have
dCi(t)= ci
ci+didQi(t) and dDi(t)= di
ci+didQi(t), so that, at time zero, dC and dD
are the same proportion of dQ as in the previous section.
ASSUMPTION 2: At bankruptcy, debtholders do not inject any capital to the
ﬁrm, that is, e in (21) is the zero function.
Under both assumptions, then either dDi < 0 (negative dividend, i.e., injection
of capital) or dCi < 0 (negative variable costs, i.e., reduction of ﬁxed costs) can
occur with positive probability.
3.2 Pricing







Note that we did not include revenue R, ﬁrst because of our assumption that
R is not public knowledge, and second, because the diﬀerence between AA and
Q is due to idiosyncratic risk (and therefore unpriced). We introduce a reference
measure PR where the doubly stochastic Poisson process
R(n) ≡ nR (25)C      R         N       E       17
has intensity νR(n)
, whereas it has intensity νQ(n)




(t,ω) = n¯ ν(ω) (26)
ν
Q(n)
i (t,ω)=n¯ νi(ω)ki(ω,t) (27)
To construct k we ﬁrst endow our probability space with another process Wv,
which is a vector of PQ Brownian motions on F￿.I nPR, Wv is independent on


















All other exogenous variables have the same distribution in both measures.







ki(t))2¯ νidt < ∞)=1
From theorem IV.4.6 in Jacod and Shiryaev (1987) it follows that P Q is
absolutely continuous with respect to P R, and the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dP Q
dPRexists.C      R         N       E       18
To regularize payments, the cash account ZB must be large. This can be






The next lemma shows then that, by increasing n, we can reduce the conditional
variance of debt payments while keeping the conditional variance of non-ﬁnancial
revenue ﬁxed. Note that debt payments will have a residual variance due to the
variance of the expected debt payment, conditional on ˆ α.
LEMMA. For any n, q there exist a vector m and correlations between Wv
i
and Wv
























We ﬁnally need to introduce a very mild assumption on the regularity of the
optimal default policy. This type of assumption is growing in popularity in the
ﬁnance literature (see e.g., Jarrow and Madan 1999). Let Ti(X) be the set of
σ(X)-measurable stopping times, that is, default policies Ti are functions of the
state variables X.W e w i l l u s e t h e n o t a t i o n Tk
i ∈T i(X) for the optimal k-th




exp(−r(s −t))dXi(s)|Xt,¯ ν] (33)




t(t) EQ[P t(t)|¯ ν]
￿
(34)C      R         N       E       19
ASSUMPTION 3: Suppose that, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T.










We have then 2 slightly diﬀerent results, depending on the bankruptcy regime.
THEOREM 3 In steady state, under assumptions 1 and 3, the value of equity






















































THEOREM 4 In steady state, under assumptions 2 and 3, for ﬁnite n,t h e












We dispense ourselves with presenting a formula for the Laplace transform of
the ﬁrst passage time Ti of a geometric Brownian motion δi under a threshold Ki,
which can be obtained by applying (5.5) in Karlin and Taylor (1975) p. 362; in
other terms, we have a closed form formula for the risk-neutral default probabil-
ities. Formula (36) is the formula for equity in the Goldstein et al (2001) model
multiplied by ˆ αi, which represents the network eﬀect. The ﬁrst term to the right
of (37) corresponds to the value of non-risky debt, whereas the second term is the
value of the bankruptcy costs. If we know the level of principal invested we can
immediately calculate credit spreads. Observe that there is one particular situa-
tion where our model results in truly constant debt payments per unit of principal,
namely when principal varies in proportion with ˆ α(t), which case Goldstein et al
(2001) prove to be optimal under assumption 1. The credit spreads will then be
independent of the state of the network (represented by ˆ α) in steady-state. In this
particular situation, ﬁnancial contagion will therefore occur only if steady state
does not hold or if restructuring costs take a diﬀerent form than assumption 1.
4. Applications
The major application of theorems 2 and 3 is the linear dependence, in steady
state, of equity and debt price on ˆ αi. In this section, we apply theorems 3 and
4 to show how market value and the counterparty-risk component of volatilityC      R         N       E    ￿￿ 21
are aﬀected by the conﬁguration of the network. More speciﬁcally we vary the
routing matrix λ in such a way that the total proportion of debt owed by each
ﬁrm (
￿
j￿=i λij)i sac o n s t a n tl, ceteris paribus. We restrict ourselves to vary:
• either the number m of counterparties of each ﬁrm (assuming the same pro-
portion of debt is owed to each counterparty)
• or the conﬁguration c of the network, for ﬁxed m
• or a combination of both.
This results in diﬀerent dynamics for the estimator of the revenue rate ˆ α.W e
assume that ˆ α is an exponential martingale in the neighborhood of t =0 , i.e.,






ˆ α(m,c,0) = ˆ α
0(m,c) (43)














where the second bracketed term in (44) and (45) is zero in the varying debt
case. We now drop the subscript i. We deﬁne the relative market value rX(m,c)C      R         N       E       22










In our model, under assumption 1, neither rX and rV depend on the type of
security (equity or debt) nor on the type of debt (varying or quasi-constant). We
study two stylized networks, a randomized network and a cyclic one.
4.1 A Randomized Network
Several authors (e.g. Giesecke and Weber 2002) use the theory of interacting
particle systems (IPS) to study credit contagion. When there is an inﬁnity of
identical ﬁrms on a lattice structure, they prove that the degree of systemic risk
decreases with increasing connectivity. We observe the same phenomenon, namely
the beneﬁt of diversiﬁcation. Note that our methodology is in this respect more
general than IPS: ﬁrms can have diﬀerent sizes, and the network does not need to
be symmetric or inﬁnite.
We simulated c =1..100 scenarios. In each scenario, we randomly varied the
conﬁguration of the network, i.e., the identity of the counterparties for ﬁxed m.
In our example there are I =10 ﬁrms with the same intensity ˆ ν(0)(at time zero)
and volatility of intensity σν of the estimator of non-ﬁnancial revenue. Intensity
of production follows a one-factor model. Each ﬁrm is exposed, with weight fi,t o
the systemic factor S ,a n dw i t hw e i g h t
￿
1 −f2
i to an idiosyncratic factor Ii.O fC      R         N       E       23







We observe the following results. First, the relative market value of debt does
not vary with m. As a consequence, a risk-averse investor always prefers a security
with a lower volatility, supposing no systematic risk and costless portfolio rebal-
ancing. Second, the average relative volatility of debt, deﬁned below, is always
decreasing with the number of counterparties:






Third, as expected, the maximum beneﬁt of diversiﬁcation (with respect to
instantaneous risk) is obtained when a ﬁrm and its counterparties have opposite
exposure to the systemic factor, i.e., fi = −fj for all j ￿= i. Figure 2 shows our
results in the case without systematic risk for diﬀerent values of l.
4.2 A Cyclic Network
In this section we analyze the same model as in the previous section, but ﬁx a
particular network structure, namely a cycle. In such a network, each ﬁrm borrows
from the m closest ﬁrms along the cycle. The results are strikingly diﬀerent from
the randomized network case, as ﬁgure (3) shows, in the case without systematic
risk. The relative volatility of debt has a minimum at around 3 or 4 counterparties.
This optimum seems fairly robust when we vary the exposure to systematic risk.
We observe regularly decreasing curves in less than 50% of all possible combina-C      R         N       E       24














Figure 2: Randomized network without systematic risk.
tions of exposures, all others showing a minimum at 3 or 4 counterparties. As in
the previous subsection, the relative market value of debt does not vary with the
number of counterparties.
5. Conclusions
We develop a structural model of default to analyzecredit risk under completely
general lending/borrowing relationships in a network economy. We derive the value
of the ﬁrm and of equity when default is aﬀected by the default of other parties
in the network, even those parties that have no direct economic link to the ﬁrm
considered. We present two versions of the model. In the ﬁrst one, there are
no ﬁxed or linear reﬁnancing costs, so that debt is completely volatile. In theC      R         N       E       25














Figure 3: Cyclic network without systematic risk.
second one, we deal with linear reﬁnancing costs, with results in quasi-constant
debt. We characterize a combination of primitives of the economy which makes it
particularly robust, i.e, immune to ﬁnancial contagion. This result should be of
particular interest to central bankers.
We apply our theory to show that, in general, ﬁrms should seek maximum
diversiﬁcation of counterparties. However, we found a very speciﬁc structure of
counterparty network where there is a ﬁnite optimum number of counterparties,
with respect to instantaneous risk.
In general, exploring the implications of the models proposed and analyzing
other related frameworks should advance our understanding of network eﬀects on
credit risk. In particular, for future research, we intend to analyze more speciﬁcally
the eﬀects of network structure on volatility and credit contagion.C      R         N       E       26
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
The independence of the cash accounts from each other is a striking result of
Jackson network theory (theorem 2.4 in Kelly 1978). Each queue can be viewed in
isolation, with the same service rate but with Poisson input ﬂow rate αi ,w h e r e
αi is given by (8), therefore the stationary distribution is Poisson.
To prove (11), we use the well-known result (see Gross and Harris 1985 equation





The other statements of the theorem, for networks where the cash accounts are
never empty, are a direct application of results contained in Mandelbaum and PatsC      R         N       E       27
(1998). The ﬂuid approximation (11) is a direct application of theorem 4.6, while
the diﬀusion approximation (10) is a direct consequence of theorem 7.2. The rate
of convergence is given in theorem 4 in Glynn and Whitt (1991). Earlier references
for single queues include Borovkov (1967) and Iglehart (1965).
Proof of Theorem 2








By corollary 2.6 in Kelly (1979), the exit ﬂow Qi from our system is a Poisson
process with rate (ci+di)¯ αi , conditional on ¯ ν. The dividend process Di is therefore









Finally, combining (49) and (50) we obtain (17). We obtain (16) by a similar
calculation.
Sketch of Proof of Lemma 1
We prove (31) only for the case i = j (i.e., for the variance and not for the
covariance), but the extension is simple. Let U
(n)
k be the sequence of interarrival
times of A(n). In steady state, U
(n)
k is stationary, and we can apply the central
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with BA Brownian motion, and:
c











k |¯ ν] (52)
Clearly V arQ[U(1)|¯ ν] is a lower bound for c2.A l s o ,Va r Q[V (1)|¯ ν] is less than
Va r Q[(U(1))2|¯ ν],w h e r eV (1) is an interarrival time of R(1).T h e n












The formula for P(t) can be found in e.g. Hull (2003) p. 543. We can easily
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Clearly, taking mi ↓ 0 we have c2
i(mi)=0 ,s ob yc o n t i n u i t yo fc2
i ,( 5 5 )s h o w s
that c2
i(mi) can take all possible values, and (31) obtains by taking a value of mi
such that c2

































Proof of Theorem 3
To calculate equity price, we neglect dividends incoming after Tf,w h i c hi s
assumed very large. By assumption 3 and (20), Si(t) is then equal to (for t ≤ T1
































































where (61) follows by the independence between (Q ,δ) and Wv in the reference
measure, (62) by the independence between Qi and (Qj,δ), and (63) by indepen-
dence between δ and ¯ ν. Following Goldstein et al (2001), the optimal bankruptcy
time T1
i is the ﬁrst passage time of δi(t) under a ﬁxed barrier, which we call δ
B
i ,
a n dw eu s et h e i rf o r m u l a st oo b t a i n( 3 6 ) .B e c a u s eo ft h es c a l i n gp r o p e r t yo ft h e
lognormal model at each default time (see e.g. Goldstein et al (2001) p. 499),C      R         N       E       30
the optimal δ
B
i and the optimal coupon (per unit of ˆ αi) scale with the value of
δi at each default time. Due to our assumption on restructuring costs, the value
of δi at each default time is constant, so that the optimal coupon (per unit of ˆ αi)
does not scale. This not only justiﬁes a posteriori our assumption of constant debt
payments (per unit of ˆ αi) but also shows that the interdefault times are identically
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